Philosophy of Science
Philosophy of science is the study of what science is, how it reasons, and what would count as its going wrong. It is unusually central to this wiki: most of the criticism catalogued here is philosophical before it is experimental, and the disputes that recur most often are about method, definition and evidence rather than about measurements.
Category: Philosophy of Science holds over 200 items.
Why this subject dominates the criticism
Very few papers on this wiki report a measurement that contradicts a standard prediction. Most argue that a standard interpretation is incoherent, that a definition has been quietly changed, or that an alternative accounts for the same data with fewer assumptions.
That is a legitimate mode of argument — it is what philosophy of physics does professionally — but it has a consequence worth stating plainly: such disputes rarely resolve by experiment, and both sides can hold their positions indefinitely without either being refuted. Readers using this wiki will understand the literature better for recognising when an argument is of this kind.
The recurring arguments
Definitions and their drift
A frequent charge is that modern physics retains familiar words while altering what they denote — that "time" in relativity is not the time of experience, that "mass" changes meaning between classical and relativistic mechanics, that "energy" has been promoted from a bookkeeping measure to a substance. Glenn Borchardt makes the last of these a general fault he calls the objectification of motion: ascribing to a measure the properties of the thing measured. See Energy for the developed case.
Assumptions rather than proofs
A second line holds that the foundational choices of a theory are assumptions that could have gone otherwise, and that presenting them as results is the error. Borchardt's Ten Assumptions of Science and the Demise of Cosmogony sets out ten such choices explicitly, arguing that the decision between a finite and an infinite universe is one of them and cannot be settled by evidence.
The conventionality of simultaneity is the best-developed instance. Because the one-way speed of light cannot be measured without already having synchronised two clocks, Einstein's synchronisation is a convention rather than a discovery — a point W Farrell Edwards formalised in 1963 in a transformation permitting an anisotropic one-way speed, and which Roger B Angel then argued against at length from the opposite side. That a mainstream philosopher and a mainstream physicist take opposite sides of it is a useful corrective to the idea that the question is settled.
Falsifiability and rescue
The most-repeated structural criticism is that the standard models are defended by amendment: that inflation, dark matter and dark energy were each introduced to remove a specific conflict with observation, and that a theory which can always be repaired is not being tested. Tom Van Flandern put it sharply — the Big Bang "no longer makes testable predictions wherein proponents agree that a failure would falsify the hypothesis." The counter-argument, equally available, is that auxiliary hypotheses are normal science and that dark matter makes its own testable predictions.
Mathematics and physical models
A fourth strand holds that formalism has displaced explanation — that a geodesic in curved spacetime describes motion without causing it, and that a probability amplitude is not a picture of an electron. Peter F Erickson pushes this to its foundations, arguing that the infinite divisibility of space is an assumption of mathematics rather than a fact about the world.
Authority, priority and suppression
A substantial part of this literature concerns the sociology of the field: peer review, the treatment of dissenting work, and disputed priority — particularly around Einstein's 1905 papers. Herbert Dingle's long dispute with the physics establishment over the clock paradox is the best-documented case catalogued here, and is instructive precisely because Dingle was an insider, a professor and a former president of the Royal Astronomical Society.
A caution
Two failure modes are common enough in this literature to be worth naming.
The first is treating a conceptual objection as though it were an experimental refutation. Showing that a theory is philosophically unsatisfying does not show that it is wrong.
The second is the appeal to suppression. That an argument is ignored is not evidence that it is correct; most ignored arguments are ignored because they are unpersuasive, and the cases where that judgement was mistaken — see Leonard B Loeb's streamer theory — are identifiable only in retrospect and by their eventual success.
Researchers and works on this wiki
Substantial philosophical work here includes Glenn Borchardt, Herbert Dingle, Harry Hamlin Ricker, Peter F Erickson, Roger B Angel, Zifeng Li and Paul Wesson. See also Infinity, Energy, Eternal Universe and Relativity.